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MAKING THE LAW SAFE FOR 
DEMOCRACY: A REVIEW OF "THE LAW 
OF DEMOCRACY ETC." 
Burt Neuborne* 
THE LAW OF DEMOCRACY: LEGAL STRUCTURE OF THE POLITICAL 
PROCESS. By Samuel Issacharoff, Pamela S. Karlan, and Richard H. 
Pildes. Westbury, N.Y.: Foundation Press. 1998. Pp. 733. $49.95. 
I. 
Henry Hart began his 1964 Holmes Lectures by asking what a 
"single" would be without baseball. We rolled our eyes at that one, 
reveling in the maestro's penchant for the occult. As usual, though, 
Professor Hart was trying to tell us groundlings something precious. 
He was warning us that conventional legal thinking, by stressing 
rigorous deconstructive analysis, can obscure an important unity in 
favor of components that should be analyzed, not solely as free­
standing phenomena, but as part of the unity. Without recognition 
of the unity, analysis of the components risks being carried on in a 
normative vacuum that will inevitably be filled by another tie­
breaking mechanism, often to the detriment of the larger enter­
prise. A ban on littering in the park, for example, taken in isola­
tion, might justify stringent prophylactic measures, like a ban on 
picnicking, or leafleting, or bringing newspapers into the park. 
Only when the littering ban is subsumed into the larger unity of a 
law of recreation (or something else) can its scope be properly ana­
lyzed.1 Thirty-five years late, I assume that was what Professor 
Hart meant when he warned us against thinking about "singles" 
without thinking about baseball. 
Nowhere is Professor Hart's warning about the potential pitfalls 
of excessively deconstructive legal analysis more important than in 
thinking about the law of democracy. Conventional legal analysis 
has ruthlessly deconstructed democracy into component parts, and 
analyzed the components with only cursory attention to the larger 
democratic enterprise. A functioning democracy is, after all, the 
sum of crucial components - free speech, political equality, liberty, 
toleration, empathy, self-interest, efficiency, and much more. In the 
* John Norton Pomeroy Professor of Law, and Legal Director of the Brennan Center for 
Justice at NYU School of Law. A.B. 1961, Cornell University; L.L.B. 1964, Harvard Law 
School - Ed. 
1. See Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
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fifty-odd years that American courts have struggled seriously with 
the care and feeding of the democratic process,2 however, legal doc­
trine has paid little attention to democracy as a unifying normative 
ideal. Instead, the functional reality of democracy in the United 
States is, and has been, held hostage to the law governing its com­
ponents. First Amendment analysis dictates the ground rules gov­
erning campaign :financing without any real attention to what kind 
of democracy comes out the other end.3 Equal protection analysis 
dominates voting rights law,4 and dictates what kind of representa­
tional patterns we can have,5 without much, if any, thought about 
what the effect will be on democracy. In truth, American courts 
often appear to govern our democracy much like a well-meaning 
umpire who thinks that rules governing "singles" can be crafted 
without thinking much about baseball. 
Until we begin to think about the law of democracy as an inter­
related set of legal principles designed to serve a normative ideal, 
the quality of American democracy will remain hostage to the law 
governing its components. That is why publication of The Law of 
Democracy: Legal Structure of the Political Process, the first 
casebook to treat the legal rules governing the democratic process 
as a unified field of study, is such a welcome event.6 One of the 
most important functions of an excellent casebook is to identify and 
reinforce a unity, helping us to approach its components not simply 
as freestanding doctrinal events, but as integral parts oLa greater 
whole. While The Law of Democracy is only the beginning of the 
process, by persuasively conceiving of the law of democracy as an 
academic unity worthy of classroom attention, the authors Samuel 
2. Somewhat arbitrarily, I date the beginning of modem judicial involvement in the law 
of democracy as occurring during the late 1940s with the decision in Colegrove v. Green, 328 
U.S. 549 (1946), followed by the White Primary cases, including Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 
(1953). Of course, earlier intersections exist. See, e.g., Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268 (1939); 
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); United States v. Guinn, 238 U.S. 347 (1915); Giles v. 
Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903). The earlier cases dealt less with contestable ground rules gov­
erning democracy than with the indefensible exclusion of black Americans from the nation's 
political life, an act of bigotry having little or nothing to do with serious thinking about 
democracy. 
3. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976). It is probably impossible to overstate the 
damage to American democracy caused by Buckley's insistence on linking free speech and 
money. 
4. Carrington v. Rash pioneered the use of equal protection analysis to protect voting 
rights. See generally 380 U.S. 89 (1965). It turns out that using equality to define voting 
rights promotes formalism and inhibits thinking about the qualitative aspect of the right to 
vote. 
5. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962). Equality-driven representational patterns are 
vulnerable to manipulation in ways that adversely affect voting quality, while respecting for­
mal equality. See also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 
U.S. 339 (1960). 
6. An earlier casebook, DANIEL HAYS LoWENSTEIN, ELECTION LAW: CASES AND 
MATERIALS (1995), provided an extremely helpful summary of aspects of the electoral pro­
cess, but did not attempt to link the material in a conceptual whole. 
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Issacharoff,7 Pamela Karlan,8 and Rick Pildes9 have performed an 
invaluable service. 
Without denigrating the book's generally excellent content, its 
most important achievement may well be its very existence. By 
providing academics with a set of challenging and useful teaching 
materials in the area of democracy, the book helps to establish the 
law of democracy as an independent field of study. One can expect 
challenges to the vision (or the lack of vision) projected by this 
book, but I do not believe that it will be possible to ignore the need 
for a democracy-centered critique of the various strands of doctrine 
that coalesce to form the legal matrix for our politics. Moreover, 
once the teaching of the law of democracy proliferates in our law 
schools, it is only a matter of time until considerably more serious 
legal academic discussion of the normative questions surrounding 
democracy emerges.10 Now that the important questions that swirl 
about the law of democracy in a rich mixture of normative debate 
and descriptive assessment have an academic focus in a discrete 
field of legal study, we can finally begin thinking about littering, for 
example, not as a freestanding idea, but in the context of an over­
arching law of recreation. 
7. Charles Tilford McCormick Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. 
8. Professor of Law and Roy L. and Rosamond Woodruff Morgan Research Professor, 
University of Vrrginia School of Law. 
9. Professor of Law and Roy F. and Jean Humphrey Profitt Research Professor, Univer­
sity of Michigan Law School. 
10. Among those questions are: Why is democracy preferable to other forms of govern­
ment? What is it that we hope to achieve by turning to democracy instead of to some other 
form of government? What version of democracy best advances the values that incline us 
towards democracy in the first place? How should we define the electorate? Is voting a 
right, a duty, or a privilege? Should the onus of registration be borne by the individual? Is 
voter registration in advance of an election still necessary? What would happen if we moved 
to same-day registration? Why isn't election day a holiday? Why not vote on the weekend? 
Why not vote on the Internet? What does it mean to cast a meaningful vote? Do perennial 
losers in politically gerrymandered districts have a real vote? How do we decide which inter­
ests are entitled to representation? What is the role of a protest vote? Should (must) the 
ballot be enriched to include "none of the above"? Who should be able to run for office? 
What is the role of major political parties? What roles do minor parties play? How should 
we staff the electoral process? Is it healthy to allow the two major parties to administer our 
electoral processes? How should we finance democracy? Should restrictions be placed on 
extremely wealthy participants in the name of equality? In the name of preventing corrup­
tion? Should we subsidize aspects of the campaign? What do we mean by fair representa­
tion? What is the responsibility of a representative? Should we have term limits? What is 
the role of groups in establishing representation? Is race different from other group charac­
teristics? When, if ever, should we move from single-member districts to forms of at-large 
representation? Should we be experimenting with aspects of proportional representation? 
What role do groups play in the democratic process? What is the role of direct democracy? 
How can we improve the quality of democratic discourse? And, what is the relative role of 
courts, legislatures, and the people in answering these questions? 
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II. 
Despite its occasionally arbitrary organization, The Law of 
Democracy teaches quite well. I attempted a course in the law of 
democracy before the book's publication. The absence of a care­
fully selected set of edited cases forced students and the instructor 
to reinvent the wheel each semester. As anyone who attempts to 
teach in a new field can attest, the burden of putting together teach­
ing materials is extremely daunting. My efforts to assign volumi­
nous, unedited case readings were only partially successful. As a 
practical matter, therefore, the book's publication makes a demand­
ing course on the law of democracy generally available for the first 
time. 
The Law of Democracy opens with a short but challenging 
Chapter entitled "Introduction to the Selection of Democratic Insti­
tutions" built around an apportionment case - Lucas v. Forty­
Fourth General Assembly of Colorado.11 In Lucas, Colorado voters 
approved an apportionment scheme that favored rural districts in 
allocating seats in the State Senate. The apportionment plan, which 
significantly deviated from the one-person, one-vote standard, was 
adopted by a majority of the voters in every Colorado county, in­
cluding the urban counties receiving disproportionately low repre­
sentation. The authors present students with excerpts from Chief 
Justice Warren's now-conventional defense of the one-person, one­
vote principle, and two dissents by Justices Clark and Stewart, rais­
ing institutional and philosophical challenges to a single approach 
to apportioning both houses of the legislatures of the fifty states. 
The authors use the opinions skillfully to raise troubling questions 
about the role of courts in setting the ground rules for democracy. 
Characteristically, the chapter is more successful in raising doubts 
about the institutional competence of courts than it is in introducing 
students to normative arguments in favor or against certain concep­
tions of democracy. Indeed, if The Law of Democracy has a serious 
flaw, it is a seeming reluctance to go beyond judicial opinions to 
explore the fundamental normative questions of democracy that 
underlie the cases. But more about that later. 
I also have a minor quibble with confining the Introduction to 
Lucas, which seems to me a bloodless case that does not reflect the 
passion that often surfaces in democracy litigation. I find it helpful 
to pair Lucas with a second case12 involving another judicial effort 
to define basic democratic ground-rules. 
11. 377 U.S. 713 (1964) (reprinted at pp. 3·11). In the teaching literature, Lucas is often 
overshadowed by its more illustrious companions such as Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), 
and Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
12. I use Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
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The introductory chapter gives way to Chapter 2, entitled "The 
Right to Participate," an exploration of the struggle to establish a 
constitutionally protected right to vote. The chapter opens with 
provocative cases a century apart upholding denial of the right to 
vote to women13 and convicted felons,14 and continues with cases 
like Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections15 and Kramer v. 
Union Free School District No. 1516 that establish the modern con­
tours of the right to vote. While the material in the chapter is thor­
ough and analytically precise, it suffers, I believe, from three 
weaknesses: a curious failure to discuss the potential doctrinal un­
derpinnings of a constitutional right to vote;17 a reluctance to ex­
plore the qualitative dimensions of voting;18 and a reluctance to 
confront broadly the normative question of who should be allowed, 
encouraged, or required to vote.19 The chapter continues with an 
exhaustive historical treatment of the struggle for black en­
franchisement,20 and closes with a tease - eight pages on the prob­
lem of declining voter turnout, especially at low income levels. 
The sad fact is that :fifty years of judicial struggle to remove for­
mal barriers to voting have not resulted in a robust level of voter 
13. See Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. {21 Wall.) 162 {1875). 
14. See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 {1974). 
15. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (reprinted at pp. 42-47). 
16. 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (reprinted at pp. 47-53). 
17. As Harper and Kramer illustrate, the Warren Court turned to the fundamental rights 
aspect of the Equal Protection Clause to fill the void in the constitutional text. What would 
happen if voting and running for office were perceived as quintessential acts of speech and 
association? See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 {1983). Does the guarantee of a 
"republican form of government" provide a basis for developing the law of democracy, de­
spite the dictum in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 {1849)? Is there a nontextual con­
ception of democracy similar to the nontextual concepts of "Our Federalism" and "the 
doctrine of separation of powers" that awaits judicial development? \Vtll evolving notions of 
customary international law ever provide judicial protection for democratic values? 
18. The Supreme Court appears to have adopted an extremely narrow conception of vot­
ing, limiting it to a formal, instrumental opportunity to choose the winner in an election, and 
rejecting any effort to infuse it with qualitative, expressive or associational values. See 
Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 {1992) (finding no constitutional right to cast write-in bal­
lot); T=ons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 {1997) (upholding ban on the 
ability of minor party to endorse major party candidate because minor party adherents are 
free to vote for preferred candidate on a major party line). 
19. Although cases denying the right to vote to women and convicted felons raise the 
issue provocatively, there is no systematic exploration of competing theories of suffrage. 
Should less-educated voters be encouraged to vote? Should voting be a duty? 
20. Throughout the book, the authors struggle with a genuine dilemma: Whether to 
stress general democratic theory or the struggle for black enfranchisement? The history of 
the systematic disenfranchisement of African Americans is the most egregious failure in our 
democratic past. Its importance in any casebook about democracy is obvious. Moreover, 
many of our most difficult contemporary democracy law issues are shaped by the desire to 
overcome that history of racial exclusion. Treating the narrative of African-American exclu­
sion as a separate topic, however, interferes with a coherent theoretical presentation. In my 
opinion, Chapter 2 on the Right to Participate is weakened by failing to integrate the story of 
African-American disenfranchisement into the general question of how the electorate is to 
be defined. 
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participation. Less than half the eligible electorate voted in the last 
Presidential election.21 The turnout for the most recent Congres­
sional elections was thirty-six percent.22 Often, state and local turn­
outs are even lower. Worse, turnouts are skewed by race and 
economic status, so that the voting electorate is much richer and 
whiter than the nation.23 Many believe that extremely low levels of 
voter turnout, especially among the poor, threaten the moral integ­
rity of the democratic process. While it is refreshing to see the issue 
raised at all, the leading casebook on the law of democracy should 
spend more time and intellectual energy considering why poor peo­
ple do not vote, and whether anything can, or should, be done 
about it. 
Chapter Three, entitled "The Reapportionment Revolution" is 
a thorough treatment of the rise of the one-person, one-vote princi­
ple, taking students from Colegrove v. Green24 through Baker v. 
Carr25 and Reynolds v. Sims.26 The authors perceptively note that 
the one-person, one-vote principle protects formal voting equality, 
but is vulnerable to gerrymanders and other techniques that main­
tain formal equality but erode voting power. The chapter includes 
thoughtful material on apportioning local government and closes 
with an excellent discussion of the United States Senate as an 
example of a defensible apportionment that radically departs from 
one-person, one-vote standards.27 
I have three quibbles with the Reapportionment Chapter. The 
first is an organizational disagreement about the best place to dis­
cuss so-called "limited purpose" elections that permit only a small 
slice of the population to vote.28 The authors treat limited purpose 
elections as a problem in local apportionment. I find it more useful 
to introduce the issue as a problem in defining the electorate, which 
would be better dealt with in a more ambitious chapter on the the-
21. See Barbara Vobejda, Just Under Half Of Possible Voters Went to the Polls, WASH. 
PosT, Nov. 7, 1996, at A30. 
22. See Terry M. Neal & Richard Morin, For Voters, It's Back Toward the Middle, WASH. 
PosT, Nov. 5, 1998, at A33; Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, Turnout 
Dips to 56-Year Low (Nov. 6, 1998) <http://tap.epn.org/csae/cgans4.html>. 
23. See Lynne M. Casper & Loretta E. Bass, Voting and Registration in the Election of 
November 1996, U.S. Census Bureau Pub. P20-504, July, 1998, at 6; Jan E. Leighley & 
Jonathan Nagler, Socioeconomic Class Bias in Turnout, 1964-1988: The Voters Remain the 
Same, 86 AMER. PoL. Ser. REv. 725, 728 (1992); Todd G. Shields & Robert K. Goidel, Partici­
pation Rates, Socioeconomic Class Biases, and Congressional Elections: A Crossvalidation, 41 
AM. J. OF PoL. Sex. 683, 686-88 (1997). 
24. 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (reprinted at pp. 117-21). 
25. 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (reprinted at pp. 122-33). 
26. 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (reprinted at pp. 135-43). 
27. Political scientists are fond of noting that Providence, Rhode Island probably has 
more political power in the Senate than the entire State of California. 
28. See Ball v. James, 451 U.S. 355 (1981); Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water 
Storage Dist., 410 U.S. 719 (1973). 
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ory of suffrage. Second, except for the thoughtfully edited judicial 
opinions, the Reapportionment Chapter has little or no material on 
the normative questions of what constitutes fair representation, 
what groups or interests deserve representation, or what the duties 
of a representative should be.29 I find it difficult to assess the one­
person, one-vote principle in a normative vacuum. Finally, the 
chapter ends just when it is becoming interesting. Once the formal­
istic limits of one-person, one-vote have been so convincingly 
demonstrated, it makes far better pedagogic (and analytic) sense to 
move immediately to techniques that comply with formal voting 
equality, but erode real-world voting power, like vote dilution, vote 
fragmentation, racial gerrymandering, and political gerrymander­
ing. That material is presented extremely well almost 200 pages 
later in Chapter Six ("Majority Rule and Minority Vote Dilution"), 
Chapter Seven ("Racial Vote Dilution Under the Voting Rights 
Act"), and Chapter Eight ("Redistricting and Representation"), 
three of the strongest chapters in the book.30 
The long hiatus between the one-person, one-vote cases in 
Chapter Three, and the vote dilution/gerrymandering issues in 
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight, is due primarily to a 100-page exe­
gesis on the preclearance provisions of Section Five of the Voting 
Rights Act, requiring so-called "covered jurisdictions" to obtain 
clearance from the Justice Department before altering their elec­
tion laws.31 The exhaustive approach to the preclearance chapter is 
repeated in the section in Chapter Two dealing with black disen­
franchisement, and Chapter Seven on the workings of Section 1\vo 
of the Voting Rights Act. While the treatment of the material is 
uniformly excellent, as I have suggested, an organizational tension 
exists between the authors' understandable desire to chronicle the 
struggle for black enfranchisement and the more general problems 
of democratic theory posed elsewhere in the book. Preclearance is 
29. Excerpts from Hanna Pitkin's classic text on the meanings of representation would be 
an obvious candidate for inclusion. See HANNA FENICHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRE· 
SENTATION (1967). 
30. The tension between theoretical coherence and broad narrative coverage of black 
disenfranchisement is illustrated in Chapter 7, which explores the intricacies of Section 2 
racial vote dilution at substantial length. It might be possible to combine the three chapters 
into a more focused discussion of the intrinsic problems that one-person, one-vote alone 
cannot resolve. 
31. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994). Preclearance zeros in on areas likely to have engaged 
in improper efforts to disenfranchise minorities, and requires them to obtain Justice Depart­
ment approval to assure that changes in election laws do not adversely affect minority voters. 
Preclearance is triggered by a sub-50% voter turnout as of a particular election, coupled with 
the existence of a "test or device," like a literacy test, capable of being used unfairly to 
disenfranchise minorities. Ironically, the entire nation met the sub-50% test in the 1996 Pres­
idential election. The states of the old Confederacy, three counties in New York City, several 
counties in California, as well as Alaska and several counties in the Southwest currently fall 
under preclearance. 
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a remarkable success story that altered the political climate of the 
old Confederacy and made black political participation a reality. 
Moreover, the preclearance material is a tour de force, demonstrat­
ing an encyclopedic grasp of theory and practice. It is, however, 
essentially a digression from the overriding issues of democratic 
theory posed by the casebook. As an important piece of history, 
and as an example of an ingenious remedial tool, material on 
preclearance has an important place in any casebook on democracy. 
But it does not deserve pride of place. 
Inserted between the one-person, one-vote material in Chapter 
Three and the vote dilution/gerrymandering coverage in Chapters 
Six, Seven, and Eight, is a curious and only partially successful 
Chapter on access to the ballot, entitled the "Role of Political 
Parties." The authors apparently view political parties as intrinsic 
guardians and gatekeepers of the ballot. Thus, the chapter attempts 
to do two things at once. It rigorously explores the limits of auton­
omy enjoyed by political parties and investigates the limits placed 
on access to the ballot. 
There is an important insight in linking political parties to ballot 
access, because the two major parties often act as a cartel to pre­
vent competition from third parties. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area 
New Party32 is only the most rec�nt example. The effort to conflate 
political parties and ballot access, however, obscures as much as it 
reveals. Deciding who should be allowed to run for office and what 
kinds of ballot choices should be available to the electorate is not 
necessarily the same thing as deciding how much autonomy polit­
ical parties should enjoy. And it certainly is not a decision that 
should be left to political parties. A more conventional approach 
that explores the ballot access cases beginning with Williams v. 
Rhodes, 33 and critiques the ballot choice issues raised by Burdick v. 
Takushi34 and Timmons from the perspective of what it means to 
cast a meaningful vote, should be an important stand-alone chapter. 
This presentation should be followed by an exploration of the role 
major and minor political parties play in the democratic process and 
a critique of the legal matrix in which parties operate. Until some 
attention is given to the normative role of political parties, both 
major and minor, I find it hard to evaluate existing law. 
Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight explore the many ways that ideal 
representation patterns can be compromised. Chapter Eight, con­
centrating on partisan and racial gerrymanders, is particularly well 
structured and provides an excellent framework for discussion of 
the inherent limitations of any system of geographically defined 
32. 520 U.S. 351 (1997). 
33. 393 U.S. 23 (1968). 
34. 504 U.S. 428 (1992). 
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representation. Once again, though, just as the chapter gets really 
interesting, it ends. The thread is not picked up until Chapter 
Eleven, a unique and provocative discussion of potential alterna­
tives to our pattern of single-member, first-past-the-post, majority 
districting, including cumulative voting, preference voting, limited 
voting, at-large districting, and proportional representation. 
Chapter Nine is a bare-bones treatment of money and politics 
that provides a basic introduction to issues posed by efforts to regu­
late campaign financing, but that falls substantially short of the 
comprehensive coverage given to other areas of democracy law. 
The chapter reproduces only three Supreme Court opinions -
Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC,35 First 
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,36 and Austin v. Michigan State 
Chamber of Commerce37 - none of which deal with contribution 
limits. H this was a chapter in a Constitutional Law casebook, the 
coverage would be adequate, especially since the authors' notes 
consistently pose thoughtful questions; but in a casebook devoted 
to the law of democracy, the coverage of money and politics is dis­
tinctly thin. 
In part, my dissatisfaction with the scope of the chapter on money 
and politics reflects a personal concern that disparity of wealth is 
among the most important issues facing American democracy. That 
massive inequalities tied to wealth exist in our political system is be­
yond dispute. The most obvious tilt towards wealth is our constitu­
tional commitment to a laissez-faire campaign financing system that 
maximizes the political power of extremely wealthy individuals and 
corporations.38 Under our existing campaign financing system, Amer­
ican political campaigns are predominantly funded by the top of the 
economic tree, with dramatic consequences for skewing the political 
agenda, selecting the candidates, affecting the outcome of elections, 
changing the course of legislative debate, and altering patterns of ac­
cess to public officials. Despite heroic efforts to control the size and 
source of campaign contributions, massive loopholes have evolved 
that permit corporations and extremely wealthy individuals to pour 
unlimited sums into the electoral process.39 Incumbents regularly out-
35. 518 U.S. 604 (1996)(reprinted at pp. 620-29). 
36. 435 U.S. 765 (1978)(reprinted at pp. 633-43). 
37. 494 U.S. 652 (1990)(reprinted at pp. 649-55). 
38. The Supreme Court has laid down the basic constitutional rules governing campaign 
financing in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). I have inveighed against the 
analysis in Buckley. See Burt Neuborne, Buckley's Analytical Flaws, 6 J.L. & PoLY. 111 
(1997); Burt Neuborne, One Dollar-One Vote: A Preface to Debating Campaign Finance Re­
form, 37 WASHBURN LJ. 1 (1997); Burt Neuborne, The Supreme Court and Free Speech: 
Love and a Question, 42 ST. Louis U. L.J. 789 (1998). 
39. The two most egregious loopholes: (1) allowing unlimited "soft-money" contribu­
tions from any source, including corporations and labor unions, to political parties, as long as 
the money is not used directly in a federal candidate's campaign; and (2) allowing unlimited 
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raise and outspend challengers by as much as sixty-to-one. Indeed, 
fully twenty-five percent of House seats, and an even greater number 
of state legislative seats, are uncontested in part because no challenger 
can raise enough money to wage a credible campaign.40 Access to the 
mass media is beyond the financial means of most candidates chal­
lenging the reigning party duopoly41 and beyond the means of many 
major party challengers seeking to unseat an entrenched figure.42 
Moreover, an equally potent, if less obvious, wealth advantage 
flows from U.S. laws governing registration and voting that, alone 
among the world's developed democracies, place the inertial obliga­
tion on the prospective voter to register in advance of the election, 
and force working people to vote on a workday.43 Burdening voting 
with significant transaction costs does more than diminish voter par­
ticipation; it skews the voting electorate towards wealthy and edu­
cated voters who are more likely to overcome multiple transaction 
costs in order to vote.44 Not surprisingly, our actual pattern of voter 
participation reflects the predicted shift toward low voter tumouts,45 
(and undisclosed) spending on so-called "issue ads" that do everything but use the "magic 
words" "vote for" or "vote against" in an obvious effort to cause the election or defeat of a 
particular candidate. The resulting practice de jour is to make huge soft money contributions 
from corporate treasuries to political parties for use in funding issue ads to run in connection 
with specific elections. The Republican Party has gone so far as to argue that the soft money 
issue ads can be coordinated with the candidate and still remain beyond the scope of the 
FEC. See Republican Natl. Comm. v. Federal Election Commn., No. 98-5263, 1998 WL 
794896 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 6, 1998). 
40. Gerrymandering to favor incumbents does not hurt either. In the most recent elec­
tion, The State of New York managed to achieve a 100% incumbency reelection rate in both 
houses of the legislature. It must be because New Yorkers are so pleased with the career 
politicians who govern us. 
41. That we have a formal duopoly is indicated by Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New 
Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997) (upholding ban on multiple-party or fusion candidacies for elected 
office); see also Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (upholding ban on write-in voting). 
42. Ballot access rules in connection with primary challenges can be so restrictive that 
only an enormously wealthy challenger can achieve ballot status. See Rockefeller v. Powers, 
78 F.3d 44 (2d Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1203 (1996) (invalidating New York's ballot 
access laws governing Republican Presidential primaries, thus permitting the first Republican 
Presidential primary in New York State's history). 
43. See NELSON w. PoLSBY & A.ARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS: STRATE­
GIES AND STRUCTURES IN AMERICAN PoLmcs 8-11 (9th ed. 1996) (citations omitted); 
Jonathan E. Davis, Comment, The National Voter Registration Act of 1993: Debunking 
States' Rights Resistance and the Pretense of Voter Fraud, 6 TEMP. PoL. & CIV. Rrs. L. REv. 
117, 118 (1997) (citations omitted). 
44. See FRANCES Fox PIVEN & RICHARD A. CLOWARD, WHY AMERICANS DoN'T VoTE 
(1988); see generally RAYMOND E. WoLFINGER & STEVEN J. RosENSTONE, WHO VoTES? 
(1980). 
45. Commentators found the 36% turnout in the most recent national elections cause for 
alarm. See Michelle Stevens, Editorial, An Exercise in Democracy, Cm. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 8, 
1998, at 37, available in LEXIS, News Library, CHISUN Ftle. See RICHARD M. SCAMMON ET 
AL., AMERICA VOTES 22: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN ELECTION STATIS­
TICS, 1996, AT 1 (1998); RICHARD M. SCAMMON & ALICE V. McG1LLIVRAY, AMERICA 
VoTES 21, 1994, at 1 (1995). The turnout in 1996 was 49%, and in 1994 was approximately 
37%. See PIVAN & CLOWARD, supra note 44, at 54, 125 (citations omitted). The highest 
turnout in the 20th century was 65% in 1960; the lowest prior to the 1990s was 49% in 1920 
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with disproportionately high participation by wealthy, well-educated 
voters, and disproportionately low participation by the poor and less 
well educated.46 
Why is our political system so rigged in favor of wealth? The story 
we usually tell ourselves is that wealth-driven political inequality is a 
necessary consequence of our liberal constitutional system. We can't 
cut back on the ability of the wealthy to dominate electoral politics 
because it would be a violation of our First Amendment commitment 
to political autonomy.47 At least that's what Buckley tells us. And we 
cannot prevent skewing the voting rolls in the direction of the wealthy 
because the idea of a legal duty (as opposed to a formal right) to vote 
is a constitutional nonstarter as a violation of political autonomy, de­
spite the fact that we tolerate compulsory jury service,48 compulsory 
education,49 compulsory military service,50 compulsory taxation,51 and 
and 1924. Turnouts in Europe average between 75 and 80% and approach nearly 95% in 
Australia. See Por.sBY & WILDAVSKY, supra note 43, at 9 (citations omitted). 
46. See supra note 24. A third tilt toward the wealthy in our system is the use of a win­
ner-take-all, single member districting that often submerges the political interests of the poor 
within a larger, more middle-class constituency. The relationship between apportionment 
and the fair representation of the poor is beyond the scope of this paper, though very much 
within its spirit. 
Fmally, restrictive ballot access laws and substantial candidate filing fees can have the 
effect of limiting candidates to economically comfortable contestants. Even if an under­
financed group achieves ballot status, it often has been forced to spend its campaign treasury 
on satisfying restrictive ballot access rules. 
47. For a representative sampling of the often excellent literature arguing that any restric­
tion on the right of wealthy individuals to spend unlimited amounts in support of a candidate 
violates the Frrst Amendment, see Bradley A. Smith, A Most Uncommon Cause: Some 
Thoughts on Campaign Reform and a Response to Professor Paul, 30 CoNN. L. REv. 831 
(1998) (arguing that reform proposals infringe on Frrst Amendment freedoms); Bradley A. 
Smith, The Sirens' Song: Campaign Finance Regulation and the First Amendment, 6 J.L. & 
PoLY. 1 (1997) (same); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech: A 
Reply to Frank Askin, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 663 (1997) (same) ; Kathleen M. Sullivan, 
Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1083 (1998) (same) . 
48. Ironically, in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975), the Supreme Court invalidated 
an effort to make jury service optional for women, holding that it violated the equal right of 
women to be subject to compulsory jury service. I have no quarrel with Taylor, but the case 
does illustrate the curious difference between our view of jury service and voting. Why 
should one be compulsory and the other not only purely voluntary, but subject to onerous 
transaction costs? 
49. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (permitting compulsory education 
to be satisfied by private school); but see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (exempting 
Amish from compulsory high school education on religious grounds). 
50. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981) (upholding compulsory military service 
for men; rejecting the argument that women have a right to be drafted); Gillette v. United 
States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (rejecting conscientious objection to a particular war as relief 
from responsibility of military service); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (uphold­
ing conscientious objection when spurred by deeply held religious or moral beliefs); United 
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (same). 
51. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (rejecting effort to obtain exemption 
from social security taxes on religious grounds). 
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compulsory cooperation with the census.52 We even tell ourselves that 
we cannot eliminate the double transaction costs for registration and 
voting because it would risk electoral fraud and insert the government 
too directly into the political process, even though six states have 
either abolished voter registration or moved to same-day registration 
on Election Day.53 The net result is a democratic process that is for­
mally equal in theory, but dramatically unequal in practice. One 
hopes that future editions of The Law of Democracy will focus more 
intensely on the role of wealth in American democracy. 
The Law of Democracy closes with an innovative and thoughtful 
chapter on direct democracy, contrasting direct and representative 
democracy. Curiously, the direct democracy chapter contains two 
of the richest democracy cases - Romer v. Evans54 and U.S. Term 
Limits, Inc. v. Thornton. 55 While both cases involve controversial 
provisions enacted through direct democracy, I wonder whether the 
underlying issues of political discrimination against unpopular 
minorities in Romer and efforts to deal with the built-in incumbent 
advantage in Thornton are best treated as issues of direct democ­
racy, or as much more pervasive issues of democratic governance. 
Ill. 
Thus far, the minor criticisms of The Law of Democracy I have 
ventured are primarily cosmetic and border on the querulous. Dis­
agreement over organization, emphasis, and pedagogy should not 
obscure my genuine admiration for the excellence of the materials, 
and my wholehearted endorsement of the casebook. There is, how­
ever, a real flaw in The Law of Democracy, a flaw shared by the 
democracy jurisprudence the casebook so artfully reflects and criti­
ques. Each purports to deal with the law of democracy without en­
gaging in a normative inquiry as to what conception of democracy 
52. In Legislature of California v. United States House of Representatives, the Supreme 
Court dismissed the appeal of a D.C. Circuit decision interpreting the Census Act to forbid 
statistical sampling techniques as a correctional device in the 1990 decennial census. See De­
partment of Co=erce v. United States House of Representatives, 11 F. Supp. 2d 76 {D.C. 
Cir. 1998), dismissed sub nom. Legislature of Cal. v. United States House of Representatives, 
119 S. Ct. 1022 {1999). 
53. North Dakota abolished voter registration in 1951. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-02 
(1997) (repealing registration law via 1951 N.D. Laws, ch. 264 § 3). Idaho, Maine, Minne­
sota, New Hampshire, and WISconsin have same day voter registration. See lDAHo CoDE 
§ 34-408A (Supp. 1998); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 122 (West Supp. 1998); MINN. 
STAT. ANN. § 201.061(3) (West Supp. 1999); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 654: 7-a (Supp. 1998); 
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 6.29 (West 1996). 
54. 517 U.S. 620 (1996)(reprinted at pp. 689-91) (holding that amendment adopted by 
referendum in Colorado violated the Equal Protection Clause because it discriminated 
against homosexuals). 
55. 514 U.S. 779 (1995)(reprinted at pp. 695-705) (holding that states can not create term 
limits for Congress members and changes in qualifications for Congress can: only be made 
through constitutional amendment). 
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the courts should seek to defend. I fear that any attempt to forge a 
law of democracy without a normative conception of what democ­
racy should be cannot yield coherent results. 
In his decision for the Court in Colegrove, and his dissent in 
Baker, 56 Justice Felix Frankfurter warned that American judges 
have no business intervening in politics, even to correct massive 
malapportionment. He warned that, lacking an explicit textual 
mandate, federal judges seeking to defend democratic values would 
necessarily function as amateur political scientists imposing per­
sonal views about the best way to organize a democracy. The out­
come of such a subjective and undisciplined process, he warned, 
would be both flawed democracy and erosion of respect for the 
judiciary. 
Justice Frankfurter was profoundly wrong in arguing that fed­
eral judges have almost no role in preserving a fair democratic pro­
cess. Reinforcing democracy is among the judiciary's most 
important tasks. Self-interested political majorities can hardly be 
trusted to set fair democratic ground rules that risk sweeping them 
from power.57 Our sorry history of selective disenfranchisement of 
vulnerable minorities, ballot manipulation, electoral bribery, gerry­
mandering, and campaign dishonesty makes clear that unreview­
able majoritarian control of the machinery of democracy invites 
erosion of underlying democratic values. In the end, Justice 
Frankfurter's warning to judges to avoid the "political thicket" sim­
ply licenses entrenched majorities to manipulate the rules of the 
game to keep themselves in power.58 
Justice Frankfurter was all too right, however, in predicting that 
judges would fail to develop a coherent approach to protecting 
democracy. In the thirty-seven years since Baker, American judges, 
accepting Justice Frankfurter's injunction that the Constitution's 
· text does not authorize judicial development of a normative vision 
of democracy, have failed to posit a coherent model of the democ­
racy they seek to protect. Lacking normative coherence, the 
"democracy" cases betray precisely the rootless activism predicted 
by Justice Frankfurter. Sadly, the judiciary has been overly timid 
when protecting democracy called for boldness; and hyperactive 
when the democratic process desperately needed a little judicial re­
straint. For example, judges have protected a narrowly defined, 
56. See Colegrove, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946); Baker, 369 U.S. 186, 280-92 (1962) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
57. See JoHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvrnw 
78 (1980). 
58. Ironically, it was Justice Frankfurter, writing for the Court in Lane v. Wilson, who 
argued that sophisticated stratagems aimed at disenfranchising blacks were subject to judicial 
invalidation. See 307 U.S. 268 (1939). 
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strictly formal right to vote,59 but have balked at developing a ro­
bust, affirmative right to vote that would confront the fact that the 
law currently skews American electoral participation radically to­
ward the wealthy and well-educated, and denies voters a chance to 
use the ballot expressively. Judges have announced a watered­
down version of a right to run for office;60 but have allowed the so­
called right to be encumbered with so many restrictions that, in 
many jurisdictions, it is prohibitively difficult for anyone except a 
major party candidate to qualify for the ballot. Judges have im­
posed ground rules for campaign financing61 that distinguish be­
tween campaign contributions and campaign expenditures, erecting 
a disastrous system that no rational legislature would have enacted. 
Judges have enforced a purely formal right to equal representa­
tion,62 but have refused to measure substantive representational 
fairness.63 Judges have both protected and attacked political par­
ties,64 but have not attempted to develop a theory of the roles of 
major and third parties in a vibrant democracy. Judges have cele­
brated the importance of political discussion, but have done little or 
nothing to assist in improving the quality of political discourse. 65 
The pragmatic consequences of the democracy cases have also 
been very disappointing. Despite judicial efforts to protect the for­
mal right to vote, voting participation is at an all-time low, varies 
dramatically by class and race, and is declining. Despite the enunci­
ation of a formal right to run for office, the Court has acquiesced in 
legally enforced duopoly control of American politics by the two 
major parties, and has upheld restrictions that render it prohibi­
tively expensive for third parties and independents to reach the 
ballot. Despite recognition that corrupt campaign contributions 
and massive wealth disparity pose a threat to the democratic pro­
cess, the Court has placed campaign finance reform in a straight-
59. See, for example, the material at Chapter 2. Pp. 17-115. 
60. See, for example, the material at Chapter 4. 
61. Chapter 9. Pp. 616-64. 
62. Chapter 3. Pp. 116-85. 
63. Chapters 6, 7, and 8. Pp. 367-440, 441-545, 546-615. 
64. Chapter 4. Pp. 186-263. 
65. The Law of Democracy does not attempt a systematic exploration of efforts to regu­
late campaign discourse directly, presumably because the First Amendment obstacles appear 
insurmountable. See, e.g., Mcintyre v. Ohio Elections Commn., 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (invali­
dating Ohio's ban on anonymous leafleting during election). Whether noncontent-based re­
strictions may be imposed on campaign speech in return for campaign subsidies remains an 
open question. Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982) (invalidating penalty for candidate's 
failure to adhere to campaign promise); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214 (1966) (invalidating 
ban on Election Day editorials); Compare Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) with Rosen­
berger v. Rector and VISitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). See Buckley v. Valeo, 
424 U.S. 1 (permitting voluntary subsidy to be conditioned on limits on individual contribu­
tions but not on campaign expenditures, independent expenditures, or expenditures out of 
candidates' own funds). 
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jacket that condemns us to a political process that looks more like 
an auction than an election. Despite formal adherence to a princi­
ple of representative fairness under the rubric "one-person, one­
vote," the Court has permitted massive reciprocal political gerry­
mandering that leaves much of the nation in noncompetitive elec­
tion districts;66 has allowed incumbents to stack the deck in favor of 
re-election; and has forbidden efforts to enhance the representative 
power of racial minorities. Despite repeated recognition of the cen­
tral role of political discussion in our democracy, the Court has de­
clined to play a role in improving the quality of electoral discourse. 
Is this the best that law can do? I think not. 
IV. 
If the judiciary is to carry out the critical function of protecting 
democracy, it must be prepared to develop and defend the coherent 
normative model of democracy latent in the constitutional text. 
Otherwise, judicial protection of democracy will continue to resem­
ble Justice Frankfurter's derisive description of ad hoc amateur 
political science. Contrary to Justice Frankfurter's assertion, I be­
lieve that the constitutional text reveals a normative vision of 
democracy that is amenable to coherent judicial articulation and 
enforcement. 
Although it is not completely silent about the mechanics of de­
mocracy, a conventional reading of the body of the Constitution 
does not yield a normative theory of democracy.67 The constitu-
66. See CENTER FOR VOTING AND DEMOCRACY, MONOPOLY POLITICS (1997) (demon­
strating that many elections are so uncompetitive that they are, for all intents and purposes, 
uncontested). 
67. Article IV, Section 4 guarantees a republican form of government to the states. 
Article I, Section 2, Clause 1 requires periodic election of members of the House of Repre­
sentatives and keys voting for the House of Representatives to the electorate for the most 
numerous house of the relevant state legislature. Article I, Section 2, Clause 2 establishes 
age, citizenship, and residence requirements for election to the House. Article I, Section 2, 
Clause 3 incorporates the infamous three-fifths compromise that counts each slave as three­
fifths of a person for apportionment purposes; provides for decennial enumeration; and im­
poses a numerical minimum on the size of a House district. Article 1, Section 2, Clause 4 
authorizes state governors to provide for interim elections to fill House vacancies. Article 1, 
Section 3, Clause 1 provides for two Senators from each state to be selected by the state 
legislatures. Article 1, Section 3, Clause 3 establishes age, citizenship, and residence require­
ments for election to the Senate. Article 1, Section 4, Clause 1 reserves to Congress the final 
power to regulate the "Tiffie, Place and Manner" of Congressional elections, except for the 
place of electing Senators. Article 1, Section 4, Clause 2 requires that Congress assemble at 
least once each year. Article 1, Section 5, Clause 1 vests Congress with power to judge the 
"elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members." Article 1, Section 5, Clause 2 
empowers each House of Congress to expel members on a two-thirds vote. Article 1, Section 
5, Clause 3 provides for publicly recorded votes and a public record of debates. Article 1, 
Section 6, Clause 1 provides for protection against arrest during the legislative session and 
establishes the speech or debate privilege shielding legislators from liability for performing 
legislative functions. Article 1, Section 6, Clause 2 prohibits members of Congress from hold­
ing other federal public office or from being appointed to a federal job created, or enhanced 
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tional text, however, contains not a word about the substantive 
right to vote or to run for office, nor about what constitutes fair 
representation. Indeed, the only explicit affirmative protection of 
democratic participation in the body of the Constitution is the pro­
hibition in Article VI on the use of a "religious test" as a "qualifica­
tion to any office or public trust under the United States."68 
The virtual silence in the body of the Federal Constitution about 
the substantive aspects of democracy is not surprising. The idea of 
a national Bill of Rights had not yet been broached. The initial 
assumption of the Founders was that each state would develop its 
own model of democracy, with the federal institutions elected in 
accordance with the respective state visions. The only checks on 
the states were the republican guarantee clause, the religious test 
clause, and the negative pregnant contained in the qualifications 
clause. 
Indeed, given the relatively undeveloped state of democratic 
political theory in 1787, it would have been miraculous to find a 
well-developed normative theory of democracy in the body of the 
Constitution. Conceptions of suffrage were extremely limited. 
Ideas of representation were in their infancy. Political parties were 
virtually unknown. Openly running for office was a new, and not 
altogether respectable, idea. 
It fell to the Article VI amendment process to flesh out a nor­
mative conception of democracy, beginning with the adoption of 
the First Amendment. The six textual ideas in Madison's First 
Amendment - no establishment of religion; free exercise of reli­
gion; free speech; free press; free assembly; and the right to petition 
government for redress of grievances - are a meticulously drawn 
road map for a functioning democracy. The First Amendment is 
organized as a series of concentric circles proceeding in orderly 
steps from protection of the interior recesses of religious conscience 
to formal political interaction with government. It opens with 
Establishment Clause protection of conscience, moves to Free Ex­
ercise Clause protection of public displays of conscience, continues 
with Free Speech Protection Clause of expression of ideas by indi­
viduals, extends to institutional expression of ideas through a free 
press, then moves to protecting collective action through free as-
in salary, during their legislative term. Article II, Section 1 establishes the Presidency and 
Vice-Presidency, with four year terms. Article II, Section 1, Clauses 2 and 3 provide for an 
Electoral College to select the President, with the number of electors equal to the whole 
number of Senators and Representatives of each state and Congress setting the time-table for 
announcing the results. Article II, Section 1, Clause 5 provides for age, citizenship, and resi­
dency requirements for the Presidency. 
68. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 3. 
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sembly ,69 and culminates in protecting formal interaction with the 
government through petitions for redress of grievances. The rigor­
ous inside-out organization of the six ideas is no coincidence. It is a 
democratic roadmap. Madison placed each essential element of the 
democratic enterprise in its natural chronological setting. The First 
Amendment mirrors the life cycle of a democratic idea, moving 
from the interior recesses of individual conscience, to discussion 
and collective action, and culminating in the formal give and take of 
politics. Madison's vision of the vibrant democracy latent in the 
unique organization of the First Amendment70 remains one of our 
most valuable guides to the kind of democracy envisioned by the 
Constitution. 
Of the seventeen amendments adopted after the Bill of Rights, 
eleven deal explicitly with the democratic process.71 The adoption 
of the Fourteenth Amendment continued the development of a 
normative conception of democracy in the Constitutional text.72 By 
explicitly introducing the idea of equality before the law into the 
Constitution for the first time, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal 
Protection Clause reinforced the picture of egalitarian democracy 
painted by the First Amendment and imposed it directly on the 
states. Moreover, the often overlooked Section Two of the 
Fourteenth Amendment explicitly linked voting and fair represen­
tation for the first time. Finally, by providing the bridge by which 
the Bill of Rights was transmitted to the states, the Fourteenth 
Amendment's Due Process Clause made possible a national ideal 
of democracy, supplanting the original invitation to each state to 
develop a separate conception of democracy with a national mini­
mum. Read in conjunction with Madison's First Amendment, the 
Fourteenth presents the outline of a powerful normative vision of 
an egalitarian democracy. 
The Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-Third, 1\venty­
Fourth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments establish and implement 
the principle of universal suffrage by banning voting discrimination 
on the basis of race, gender, wealth, or age; and by providing for the 
direct popular election of Senators, and the participation of the res­
idents of the District of Columbia in the election of the President. 
69. At about this point, Justice Harlan dropped a seventh, non-textual idea into the First 
Amendment - freedom of association. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 454-55 {1963) 
(Harlan, J., dissenting); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 {1958). 
70. No other rights-bearing provision in our constitutional experience, or in the constitu­
tional experience of our sister democracies, bears a similar organizational pattern. 
71. Of the six post-Bill of Rights amendments that do not deal with democracy, two, the 
18th and 21st, deal with Prohibition; one, the 13th, abolishes slavery; one, the 11th, limits 
federal jurisdiction over states; one, the 16th, authorizes the income tax; and one, the 27th, 
limits Congress's power to raise its own pay. 
72. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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The Twelfth, Twentieth, Twenty-Second, and Twenty-Fifth Amend­
ments "democratize" the Presidency by providing for the separate 
election of the President and Vice-President, limiting the term of a 
lame duck President, imposing a two-term limit on the Presidency, 
and assuring orderly succession in time of Presidential disability. 
Thus, whatever the failings of the body of the 1787 Constitution, the 
complete modem text, as amended, is suffused with a normative 
vision of democracy that views every American as a member of a 
self-governing community of political equals and that guarantees all 
members of the polity the equal right to participate effectively in 
the processes of self-governance. 
In New York Times v. Sullivan, 73 the Supreme Court committed 
to a normative model of the First Amendment. For thirty-five years 
the Court has rigorously, some might say ruthlessly, enforced that 
model. The Court has never made a similar commitment to a nor­
mative model of democracy. Until that commitment takes place I 
fear that the law of democracy will continue to look like Hamlet 
without the ghost. The Law of Democracy displays extraordinary 
talent and commitment in revealing, clarifying, and critiquing what 
our law of democracy currently is. I look forward to future editions 
that grapple as vigorously with what our democracy should be. 
73. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
